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Presentación
Luego de cinco números dobles, correspondientes a los años 2003-2007, Economía 
vuelve, a partir de este número 61, a su emisión normal y su periodicidad semestral. El 
tema central de esta entrega es el del crecimiento económico, al que van dedicados los 
dos primeros artículos. El de Norman Loayza, pasando revista a la experiencia peruana de 
crecimiento económico en las últimas décadas, y el de Estela Salles y Héctor Noejovich, 
quienes exploran las bases del crecimiento económico del virreinato peruano a partir del 
programa de reforma implantado por el virrey Toledo, entre 1569 y 1580. Los artículos 
de Manuel Barrón y Cecilia Garavito, abordan temas vinculados a los aspectos sociales 
de la estructura económica y empresarial en el Perú, respectivamente, mientras el de 
Gabriela Cuadra y David Florián, enfocan el tema del comercio de bienes agrícolas en el 
contexto de la economía de las naciones sudamericanas.
El número se completa con una Nota acerca de la revista Economista peruano, 
publicada en los inicios del siglo XX, por los pioneros de la especialidad en el Perú, y por 
las habituales reseñas de libros de economía de aparición reciente.
El Director
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Exclusion and Discrimination as Sources 
 of Inter-Ethnic Inequality in Peru*
Manuel Barrón** 
IFPRI
RESUMEN
De acuerdo a la Enaho 2003, el ingreso promedio de un trabajador indígena es solo 56% 
del de un trabajador no-indígena. Sin embargo, estudios sobre discriminación étnica en los 
mercados laborales de Perú usualmente hallan brechas demasiado pequeñas como para explicar la 
desigualdad observada. De acuerdo a Figueroa (2003), la exclusión social es una fuente importante 
de desigualdad interétnica, pero esto no ha sido contrastado empíricamente. El objetivo central 
de este documento es llenar esa brecha estimando qué porcentaje de la desigualdad se debe a 
exclusión y qué porcentaje a discriminación, comparando directamente los efectos. La metodología 
econométrica utilizada (hurdle	models)	permite incluir en el análisis a los trabajadores con ingresos 
nulos y contrarrestar problemas de endogeneidad econométrica. Los resultados implican que la 
exclusión juega un papel más importante que la discriminación. Sin exclusión, el Gini de ingresos 
laborales se reduciría de 0.64 a cerca de 0.45; sin discriminación, a alrededor de 0.50.
Palabras	clave:	desigualdad interétnica, exclusión, hurdle	models.
ABSTRACT
According to the 2003 National Household Survey, mean labour income for an indigenous 
worker is only 56% of that for a non-indigenous worker. Studies of ethnic discrimination in 
Peru’s labour markets generally find that discrimination is too low to explain inequalities of this 
magnitude. However, Sigma Theory (Figueroa 2003) predicts that social exclusion is a source of 
inter-ethnic inequality, and that has not been empirically tested. The primary aim of this paper 
is to fill this gap by estimating the extent to which exclusion and discrimination contribute to 
income inequality. Hurdle models are used to tackle down econometric endogeneity of years of 
schooling and truncation-at-zero of incomes. The results imply that exclusion plays a stronger 
role on inequality than discrimination: without exclusion, the Gini of labour income would 
decrease from 0.64 to 0.45, and without discrimination it would be reduced to 0.50.
Keywords:	inter-ethnic inequality, exclusion, hurdle models.
JEL Codes: C24, J31, o15
* This paper is based on the thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of Master of Science in 
Economics for Development at the University of oxford, June 2006. I am grateful to Sudhir Anand, Mans 
Soderbom, and the anonymous referees for their insightful comments. All errors and omissions are my own.
** International Food Policy Research Institute. Contact address: m.barron@cgiar.org.
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INTRoDUCTIoN
Several studies have tried to measure the degree of ethnic discrimination in Peru’s 
labour markets (see for example Trivelli 2005, Figueroa and Barrón 2005, Barrón 2005, 
Ñopo et	al. 2004, Mc Isaac 1994), generally finding little discrimination if any at all. 
However, according to the National Household Survey of 2003, mean labour income 
for an indigenous worker is only 56% of that for a non-indigenous worker. As shown in 
section 4, for the expected value of lifetime labour income, the figure is 44%. In addition, 
Peru systematically shows very high inequality indices (Gini and Theil’s T measure for 
incomes of around 0.55 and 0.80, respectively). Since discrimination does not appear to 
play an important role in this outcome, exclusion must be the main driver of inequality, 
but that hasn’t been properly addressed in the literature. The primary aim of this paper is 
to fill this gap by estimating the extent to which exclusion and discrimination contribute 
to income inequality and compare their effects directly. 
A further contribution of this paper is the implementation of an econometric 
methodology to obtain unbiased estimates of the determinants of labour income. Two 
problems arise in the estimation: in first place, education is likely to suffer of econometric 
endogeneity; and in second place an important share of workers is unpaid, and thus the 
distribution of incomes is truncated at zero, therefore non-normality in the distribution 
of the endogenous variable arises. Even though the first problem is usually taken into 
account, the second problem is not discussed in the literature. A two-tiered or «hurdle 
model» is used to asses these problems. The first tier assesses the probability of having 
positive dependent variable and the second one estimates the expected value of the 
dependent variable given that it is positive. Three methodologies were used to address 
the problem of econometric endogeneity in the second tier: instrumental variables, 
proxy variables, and household fixed effects. 
1. HISToRICAL BACKGRoUND
Latin America is the most unequal regions of the world (Deininger and Squire 1996; 
Li et	al. 1997). A recent current of economic history has focused on the relationship 
between inequality and the colonial past of Latin American countries (e.g. Engerman 
and Sokoloff 2002, Acemoglu et	al. 2002, Mahoney 2003). These authors share the idea 
that the dynamics of inequality are driven by inertia, meaning that current inequality 
depends on past inequality, process that has been called «path dependence». Inequality 
is the heaviest burden from Latin America’s colonial past.
Where indigenous population was dense, political elites excluded broad spectrums of 
society from the basic entitlements of citizenship (Mahoney 2003). This lead to inequality 
in factor endowments, which is profound determinant of the type of institutions that 
emerge in a society (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). Where initial inequality was high, 
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elites were in a better position to establish legal frameworks that would guarantee 
political power and economic opportunities. In this type of societies, the result is the 
establishment of extractive institutions rather than industrialisation, which in turn, 
reproduce high inequality (Acemoglu et	al. 2002).
Summing up the different approaches, it may be argued that the indigenous density 
(the share of indigenous people in total population) determined the width of citizenship, 
which, in turn, determined the type of institutions that prevailed in the society. These 
institutions determined public policies regarding education, land, and health, as well 
as fiscal and monetary policies (tax system, social assistance programs, etc.); which set 
incentives in favour of either extractive activities or industrialisation. While the formers 
reproduce high inequality, the latter reproduces relatively low inequality. Hence, the 
initial share of indigenous population was a determinant of the degree of inequality. 
New questions arise now. What factors determined the density of indigenous population 
before the arrival of the Spaniards? Was it economic prosperity of the different regions? 
or maybe central planning decisions by the corresponding empire? The answers to these 
questions constitute very interesting and challenging issues to pin down, but are beyond 
the scope of this study.
With the Spanish invasion, indigenous peoples went through a number of economic 
shocks over and above social degradation. In first place, they experienced a major 
demographic shock because of the diseases carried by the Spaniards, for which they did 
not have developed antibodies (Diamond 1997). In second place, labour was relocated 
massively from agriculture to mining, according to the main interest of the Spaniards. 
At the same time, indigenous people were expelled from the most productive lands, 
being left with the least productive or with none at all. These shocks in the main means 
of production (labour and land) originated severe disequilibria, and hence serious 
inefficiencies, which agglutinated the indigenous peoples in the poorest clusters of 
society. Moreover, their economic system (based on reciprocity and redistribution) 
was abruptly replaced by the Spanish, where the State was a fierce tax collector with 
practically no redistribution to the people.1 
In addition, indigenous people were excluded from formal education, literacy being 
an exceptional characteristic amongst them. By doing so, the Spaniards blocked their 
access to human capital, thus impeding their entrance to the modern sector of the 
economy and confining them to extractive activities.
Independence came after almost three centuries, but nothing changed for indigenous 
peoples in Latin America (Albó 2002). Literacy and landholding were conditions to vote 
1 In the case of Peru, the so-called «indigenous tax» was one of the main sources of income during the time 
of the Viceroyalty, as well as during the first phase of the Republic. After being abolished and almost imme-
diately reestablished several times, it was definitively eliminated during the government of Ramón Castilla 
during an economic boom driven by guano exports. For a more detailed discussion of the indigenous tax in 
Peru, see Estela (2001).
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and to run for public posts. This meant that the majority of indigenous people was 
excluded from electing the political authorities, but also that indigenous authorities 
were not able to get a place in the formal political system. Their exclusion was based 
on the grounds that indigenous did not have capacity of organisation, or that they 
could be easily manipulated. Nevertheless, indigenous organisations managed to rule 
politically over several countries of South America (the Inca Empire) and Central 
and North America (the Maya empire). Peru abolished the literacy requirement very 
recently, just in 1979. Even though this is not a sufficient condition, the right to vote is 
a necessary condition to eliminate interethnic social, political and economic inequality 
(Ames 1978).
2. THEoRETICAL FRAMEWoRK
Before spelling out the theoretical framework, two key terms must be clearly explained. 
The first one is for exclusion:
A social group is considered excluded if it is not allowed to participate in some social relations 
of the social process which are desirable by the group. Exclusion implies the existence of 
hierarchies of activities and memberships inside the society. (Figueroa et	al. 1996).
Discrimination will be defined as different treatment to individuals that, apart from 
being of different groups, have similar observable characteristics. Hence, exclusion 
might be understood as discrimination in access. Both exclusion and discrimination are 
sources of inequality between-groups, and may interact reinforcing their effects. 
A theoretical model is needed to explain the existence and persistence of exclusion 
and discrimination. Neoclassical theory cannot explain these phenomena. on the other 
hand, Sigma theory (Figueroa 2006, 2003) is a theory that can explain both phenomena 
based on the existence of Z-workers, an underclass formed by the descendants of 
indigenous populations in post-colonial societies.2
Figueroa (2006: 22) shows that Sigma theory predicts the existence of exclusion. 
Regarding discrimination, Figueroa (2006: 11-17) clearly specifies the mechanisms 
through which, according to Sigma theory, education is transformed into human 
capital, and human capital into income. Z-workers (the indigenous population) face 
several disadvantages compared to the other ethnic groups (the white and the mixed). 
In first place, they accumulate less years of schooling than the other groups. Moreover, 
structural differences in the quality of education, peer effects, intellectual stimulation 
at home, command of language, and access to public goods imply that, with the same 
number of years of schooling, indigenous people accumulate less human capital than 
non-indigenous people. Since employers pay for human capital, a Z-worker will receive 
2 The reader is strongly encouraged to refer to Figueroa (2003, 2006) for comprehensive expositions of 
Sigma theory.
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a lower retribution for his work than a Y-worker with the same years of schooling, 
because of differences in the non-observable characteristics. According to the preceding 
definitions, this is labelled as discrimination. 
3. DATABASE DESCRIPTIoN
The data were obtained from the 2003 Enaho (which stands for Encuesta	 Nacional	
de	Hogares, spanish for National Household Survey), run by INEI, Peru’s bureau of 
statistics. Monthly rounds took place between May 2003 and April 2004. INEI has 
been conducting Enaho yearly since the mid 90s, complying with the LSMS standards 
of the World Bank.
The survey covered 18,912 households, with 88,648 individuals. The estimated 
population is 6,184,824 households and 29,175,200 individuals. It is representative at 
the following levels:
• National
• Urban Peru
• Rural Peru
• Department (24 Departments plus the Constitutional Province of Callao)
• Geographic sub-region (urban Coast, rural Coast, urban Andes, rural Andes, urban 
Amazonian, rural Amazonian)
• Metropolitan Lima (including Callao)
It also has a panel dimension, representative at the following levels:
• National 
• Urban Peru
• Rural Peru
• Geographic region (Coast, Andes, Amazonian)
4. INCoME INEQUALITY BY ETHNIC GRoUPS
4.1. Ethnic markers3
Ethnicity is a concept of heated debates in social sciences (Assies et	al. 2000). No single 
definition has been universally accepted. It is a fluid concept both in time and space. The 
purpose of this paper is not to develop a perfect ethnic variable for Peru but, given the 
available data, to use the best proxy for it in order to make inference at national level. 
This also constitutes a contribution to the literature because most studies of interethnic 
inequalities in Peru’s labour markets are not representative at the national level.
3 This section draws importantly on Figueroa and Barrón (2005).
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Ethnic markers usually include self-reported ethnicity, race, mother tongue, religion, 
place of birth. The feasibility of each of these markers will be assessed, and the best one or 
best combination of them will be used to identify empirically Peru’s main ethnic groups.
A point of departure is the importance of ascription by others versus self-identification. 
In Peru, ascription by others seems to be more important than self-identification. People 
would tend to hide their indigenous background because of discrimination. So, self-
reported variables would tend to underestimate the size of the indigenous population. 
As will be shown below, Ñopo et	al.	(2004) illustrate this clearly.
Religion does not work in Peru, because Catholicism cuts across most of the 
groups. Mother tongue has been extensively used, but is not appropriate. Speakers 
of aboriginal tongues are mostly indigenous, but the converse is not true, especially 
in urban areas, which constitute two thirds of total population (Figueroa and Barrón 
2005, Ñopo 2004). Self-reported race or ethnicity would not work either, because 
people tend to whiten themselves (Ñopo 2004) or hide in the mestizo category, 
arguably due to racism. Imputed race would work, but there is no public database on 
race at national level.
The most extensive study (representative of Peru’s urban areas) using race has been 
carried out by researchers at Group of Analysis for Development (Grade) (Ñopo 2004, 
Ñopo et	al. 2004, Torero et	al. 2004, Moreno et	al. 2004). A racial score was constructed 
based on four main racial characteristics: asiatic, black, indigenous and white. The 
score ranged from zero to ten, zero meaning that the individual did not have any of 
the racial characteristics of that particular group, and ten meaning that the individual 
had all the characteristics of that group. The score was selected by the interviewees 
and, independently, by the interviewers, who received rigorous training in order to 
homogenise their racial perceptions.
Grade’s dataset is the best illustration as to why mother tongue is not a good ethnic 
marker: 79% of the individuals in the quintile of the «most indigenous» report Spanish 
as mother tongue. Hence, at least four out of five indigenous have Spanish as mother 
tongue. In the same group, 48% declare that their mother’s mother tongue is Spanish 
as well, even though this proves to be a slightly better indicator (shows slightly higher 
correlation with the ethnic score). Although this is an urban sample, it is worth noting 
that roughly two thirds of Peru’s population lives in urban areas. So, even if mother 
tongue were a good ethnic marker in rural areas, the results for two thirds of the sample 
would be inaccurate.
With this dataset, Ñopo (2004) suggests that after controlling for a large set of 
characteristics, there are racially related earnings differences in favour of predominantly 
white employees. However, in the case of self-employed workers, none of the empirical 
distribution of differences differs from zero in any case.
Ñopo et	 al.	 (2004) find a difference of nearly 50% between the incomes of the 
individuals in the highest and lowest percentiles (percentiles 100 and 1, respectively) of 
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white intensity. After controlling for observable characteristics the gap shrinks to 12% 
(roughly one fourth of the initial gap). Interpreting their results for the purposes of this 
paper, 3/4 of the gap is due to exclusion, and 1/4 to discrimination. It must be kept in 
mind that this is the most extreme gap.
Ethnic groups in Peru may be defined at different levels. A very general 
classification would be in three layers: indigenous, mixed and white. However, there 
are several types of indigenous people. Indigenous people are usually associated to 
the Quechua people, because the Quechua ruled in the time of the Inca Empire. 
The Quechua ruled politically over almost half of South America, but they did not 
dominate culturally over their whole territory. They dominated culturally in what are 
now Peru’s Southern Andes and the north-west of Bolivia, but not so in the rest of the 
Empire. For instance, despite Quechua is the main indigenous language in the Andes, 
Quechua speakers use different versions of the language (Quechua mixed with the 
original local languages, and sometimes even with Spanish), some of these versions 
being unintelligible between them.
Referring to the current political map of Peru, different indigenous groups existed in 
the Coast (e.g. Paracas, Pachacamac, Chimu), in the rest of the Andes (e.g. Caxamarca, 
Wanka), and in the Amazonian, most of which was not conquered by the Inca empire 
(e.g. Ashaninkas, Huitotos). one could go on to describe each group in these regions, 
but this would require more detailed databases. However, the breakdown proposed 
here indeed gives insights of the ethnic composition of Peru. An indigenous from the 
Northern Coast may have the same social status than one of the Southern Coast, but 
they are different from, say, the Andean indigenous. Furthermore, there is a clear divide 
between the indigenous from the Southern Andes (strongest Inca influence) and from 
the rest of the Andes. In turn, the Amazonian hosts dozens of different groups, but for 
the purposes of the present paper they will be treated as one. The Spaniards settled mainly 
in Lima and in the main cities of the interior, most of which now constitute capitals of 
the departments. Lima constituted an attractor of massive flows of migration from the 
interior of the country, mainly indigenous people. These flows settled in the outskirts of 
Lima, constituting what are now huge shantytowns, but not in the residential districts, 
what is called the «white core» of Lima.
Figueroa and Barrón (2005) took this line of argument and, based on Peruvian 
history and geography, proposed seven ethnic groups based on the region of birth of 
the individuals. A similar argument was also proposed by Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian 
political leader and thinker of the early XX century, and the first to put forward 
the indigenous problem as a political issue in 1923 (Mariátegui 1928). «our social 
problem is rooted in the Coast and in the Andes. The Coastal worker is Yunga (regional 
indigenous), black, asiatic, white, or a mixture of these types […].The Andean worker is 
indigenous, somewhat mixed with white in the North, and pure Quechua or Aymara in 
the South» (Haya de la Torre 1984 [1923]: 24, my translation).
58 Economía Vol. XXXI, N° 61, 2008 / ISSN 0254-4415
Two different ethnic breakdowns are used in this paper. In first place «indigenous» 
and «non-indigenous» are treated as broad groups; and in second place a breakdown 
of these groups. «Indigenous» was split into four groups (Coast, Central and Northern 
Andes, Southern Andes, and Amazonian); and «non-indigenous» into three groups 
(Lima-core, Lima-periphery and local-core). Even though region of birth is not a 
perfect ethnic marker, it should be accepted that it is at	least highly correlated with 
ethnicity.
This methodology gives the highest estimate of indigenous population in Peru. 
According to the definition proposed by Figueroa and Barrón (2005), two thirds of the 
population is indigenous. This makes Peru comparable with Bolivia, where over 60% 
of the population is indigenous. other studies give Peru at most 50% of indigenous 
population (Trivelli 2005). A straightforward task to contrast empirically the validity of 
the ethnic variable proposed by Figueroa and Barrón (2005) is to contrast of place of 
birth with Grade’s database on imposed race. However this was not possible, because the 
database was not publicly available at the time of writing.
4.2. Income by ethnic groups
INEI provides inflation-corrected versions of the monetary variables (INEI 2004: 18). 
However, the main source of price variation is not inflation, but geographic region.4 
Therefore, a geographic deflator is needed to get meaningful variables. INEI computed 
poverty lines by district, split between rural and urban, i.e. each district is split in two: 
urban and rural. For simplicity each of these parts will be called a «zone».
Any zone can be used as a numeraire. However, Metropolitan Lima is an especially 
appealing candidate for the following reasons: (a) it is intuitive to deflate the rest of 
the zones with respect to the capital; (b) it does not have rural areas, so it has only one 
poverty line; (c) it has the largest number of observations, so it is the most solid poverty 
line; and (d) it can serve as a consistency check: since Lima is the most expensive city in 
Peru, all the rest should have lower poverty lines.5
In order to express all the monetary variables in terms of Lima’s price level, the 
poverty lines were used to construct a deflator as follows:
Where w
i
 is the real value for zone i,	W
i
	 is the nominal value for zone i, P
L 
is the 
poverty line for Lima, and P
i 
is the poverty line of the zone i.
4 In fact, inflation has been rather low between 2000 and 2006, with a maximum of 2.5% per year since 
2000.
5 The range goes from 0.51 to 1.00 of Lima’s poverty line, so the consistency of the database is not rejected 
by this test.
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Table 1 shows the share of population aged 25 and over by level of education and 
their mean net real income. The income variable is the sum of (after tax) monetary, 
in-kind, and extraordinary income. While 70% of the non-indigenous population 
has completed high school education or more, 70% of the indigenous population 
have at most elementary school. This is a clear example of exclusion in the access to 
education.
To test formally for differences in incomes, two types of tests were performed. In 
first place, t tests (allowing for unequal variances) for differences in mean incomes; and 
in second place, non-parametric tests for difference in median income. For every level 
of education the difference in mean and median income between indigenous and non-
indigenous is significant at 99% of confidence.
With the «broad» definition of ethnic groups, the starkest result is that the mean 
income for non-indigenous is twice the mean income for indigenous, even excluding 
the elite, which is usually underrepresented in household surveys and is overwhelmingly 
non-indigenous (Figueroa 2002). Despite being one third of total population, the 
non-indigenous have almost one half of aggregate income. Including the elite, their 
share of income might be even over 50%.
Table	1	
Peru:	Mean	real	income	and	level	of	education	[1],	by	ethnic	groups
Non-Indigenous Indigenous Difference
Level	of	Education % income	[2] % income	[2] [3]
No Level 9.7 3,986 38.9 2,285 ***
Elementary School 20.3 7,014 29.6 5,092 ***
High School 40.0 9,232 20.9 8,200 ***
Post High School 29.9 23,445 10.6 19,013 ***
Total 100.0 13,145  100.0 7,369  ***
Source: Enaho 2003. 
Elaboration: owner.
Notes: [1] For population aged 25 or older [2] Mean yearly income in real Nuevos Soles (Lima=100) [3] 
T test of equality of means ***,**,*: significant at 99, 95 and 90 %, allowing for unequal variances in each 
distribution.
Lima-Core is the category that proxies the «white» population. Lima-Periphery and 
Local Core are mostly mestizos, but may also include whites. The rest of the regions are 
mostly indigenous. once disaggregated ethnic groups are taken into account, inequality 
is exacerbated when comparing the «whites» with the other groups.
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Table	2	
Peru:	Income	and	population,	by	ethnic	groups
Share	of	
Population
Share	of	Aggregate	
Income	[1]
Mean	per	capita	
Income	(S/.)	[1]
Broad	ethnic	groups
Non-Indigenous 33.3 46.7 10,835
Indigenous 66.7 53.3 4,539
Total 100.0 100.0 6,244
Disaggregated	ethnic	groups
Lima - Core 3.8 10.7 19,038
Lima - Periphery 15.1 25.3 11,262
Local Core 14.4 18.6 8,679
Rest Coast 16.4 15.9 6,562
Amazonian 10.0 5.7 3,884
Northern and Highlands 21.7 12.9 4,023
Southern Highlands 18.6 10.8 3,924
Total 100.0 100.0 6,244
Source: Enaho 2003. 
Elaboration: owner. 
[1] Income in Lima prices in May 2003
Figure 1 shows the yearly income by age and ethnicity. Both streams lie outside the 
other’s 95% confidence intervals. The upper curve is for the non-indigenous, whereas 
the lower one is for the indigenous. The difference in the expected stream of incomes 
is shocking. Taking an interest rate of 3.5% per year,6 the net	present	value of the expec-
ted flow of lifetime incomes for a mean 14 year old indigenous is around S/.109,000 
(US$31,000), whereas it is more than double for the mean non-indigenous, up to 
S/.251,500 (US$72,000). For a better understanding of these figures, GDP per capita 
in Peru is around US$2,000, so while an indigenous worker would get 15.5 times the 
GDP per capita throughout his lifetime, an non-indigenous would get 36 times the 
GDP per capita.7
6 This rate approximately resembles Peru’s Central Bank interest rate, which was 3.6% in January 2006.
7 In the case of the non-indigenous, there is a rather suspicious peak between ages 56 and 64. To test for 
the possibility of sampling errors, the same procedure was followed with the 2002 survey. The series (not 
reported, but available upon request) fall within their 95% confidence intervals, so there does not appear to 
be evidence of sampling problems.
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Figure	1	
Peru:	Yearly	income,	by	age	and	ethnic	group,	with	95%	confidence	intervals	(S/.)		
(gray	line	is	non-indigenous,	black	line	is	indigenous)
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Source: Enaho 2003. 
Elaboration: owner.
Figure	2		
Peru:	Years	of	schooling,	by	age	and	ethnic	group	
(gray	line	is	non-indigenous,	black	line	is	indigenous)
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Source: Enaho 2003. 
Elaboration: owner.
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Figure 2 shows the years of schooling by age. It is clear that mean years of education 
for indigenous people peaks for the population in their early of decade of 1920 at around 
9 years of schooling, and then start declining steadily, with the older cohorts around a 
mean of 3 years of schooling. For the non-indigenous, the peak is reached at 28 years, 
with a mean of more than 12 years of schooling, and for the older cohorts the average 
is more than 11 years (i.e. complete secondary) until the age of 50. The oldest cohorts 
have around on average 8 years of schooling (more than complete primary). A positive 
aspect is that the gap in years of schooling seems to be closing.
5. DECoMPoSITIoN oF INEQUALITY INDICES
Table 3 shows that the within-group component of inequality accounts for the most 
important share of overall inequality, over 90%. Between-group inequality accounts for 
around 9%. This is consistent with estimates by individual income, where within-group 
inequality accounted for around 6% of overall inequality.
These figures are more important than they appear at first sight. If one randomly splits the 
population into two groups, the between-group inequality should be non-existent (Anand 
1983). The fact that it explains up to 9% of overall Peru’s inequality is actually worrying.
Table	3	
Decomposition	of	Theil’s	T	measure	of	household	income,	by	seven	ethnic	groups
T Measure Share
T within 0.549 91.4
T between 0.052 8.6
T overall 0.601 100.0
Source: Enaho 2003. 
Elaboration: owner.
Table	4	
Breakdown	of	within-group	inequality,	by	households
Non-Indigenous Indigenous
Total
A1 A2 A3 B C D E
Theils T measure 0.474 0.445 0.517 0.401 0.452 0.656 0.611 0.601
Sample Size 109 820 2,937 3,056 1,930 4,563 5,415 18,830
Contribution to Tw 0.003 0.019 0.081 0.065 0.046 0.159 0.176
Contribution to 
overall inequality (%) 0.5 3.2 13.4 10.8 7.7 26.5 29.3 91.4
Source: Enaho 2003. 
Elaboration: owner.
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Table 4 shows the breakdown of within-group inequality of household income. 
Two striking facts arise from Table 4. In first place, the contribution of within-group 
non-indigenous inequality to overall inequality is low: taken together, their within-
group inequality accounts for 16% of overall inequality. Secondly, groups D and E 
(indigenous from the Central and Northern Highlands and indigenous from the 
Southern Highlands) are the biggest contributors to inequality. Together they account 
for over 55% of overall inequality. 
6. ECoNoMETRIC SPECIFICATIoN oF INCoME EQUATIoNS
In this section econometric analysis will be undertaken. Two problems arise in the 
estimation of the equations: econometric endogeneity and non-normality of the 
dependent variable, due to a significant proportion of workers with null incomes 
(unpaid workers). Despite the former issue is usually assessed, the latter has been 
ignored in the literature. However, unpaid workers represent a significant sample of 
the sample (18%) and they are mostly indigenous, so ignoring them would affect the 
results seriously.
The dependent variable in the following equations is not the usual hourly income, 
but annualised income instead. This allows testing for increasing, constant, or decreasing 
marginal returns to time worked.
one equation was estimated for each ethnic group (using the broad definition), to 
avoid including an excessive number of interaction dummies and then the difference 
between the coefficients was analysed following the same procedure as in section 4.2. 
Splitting the sample in two is not expected to affect the efficiency of the results because 
of the relatively big sample size (9,181 and 31,599 observations for non-indigenous and 
indigenous, respectively).
6.1. Non-normality of the endogenous variable
More than 18% of the sample is constituted by unpaid workers, therefore the dependent 
variable cannot be assumed to be normally distributed. Studies like Trivelli (2005) drop 
them out of the sample (Trivelli 2005: 72), but this is likely to bias the findings. Unpaid 
workers cannot be dropped, because they are mostly indigenous (23% of indigenous are 
unpaid workers, whereas only 8% of non-indigenous fall in this category) and therefore 
dropping them would bias the results towards underestimation of interethnic income 
inequality. Unpaid worker’s remuneration can actually be treated as if it were actually 
zero. They typically receive housing, (cooked) food and sometimes education. However, 
this is not an in-kind payment. They receive consumption goods as any other member 
of the family, but they do not decide what will be the payment, nor are able to dispose 
of it freely.
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Tobit models were initially considered to address the problem of null incomes. This 
type of models has two parts. In a first stage, a probit model estimates the probability of 
the outcome being non-zero, conditional on the set of regressors. In the second stage, 
an oLS (ordinary Least Squares) model estimates the expected value of the outcome 
(conditional on the same set of regressors) given that the outcome is greater than zero. 
The Mincerian specification was used as a baseline.
A shortcoming of Tobit models is that the same set of regressors is used in both 
stages. Different variables may affect one stage but not the other, so including them in 
both regressions would lead to a problem of inclusion of irrelevant variables, resulting in 
inefficient parameter estimates. omitting the variables might lead to a worse problem. 
Furthermore, by construction of the model the marginal effect of each variable has the 
same sign both in determining the probability of having a positive outcome and of the 
size of the outcome, given that it is positive. This assumption may be too restrictive. To 
relax it, two-tiered models were estimated. In the first stage, the probability of being 
a remunerated worker was modelled. In the second stage, the income equation was 
specified. Using the same set of regressors proved not to be a problem in this case because 
both sets of regressors had the same type of effects in each tier.
The idea underlying the hurdle formulations is that a binomial probability model 
governs the binary outcome of whether a variable has a zero or a positive value. If the 
realisation is positive, the «hurdle is crossed», and the conditional distribution of the 
positives is governed by a truncated-at-zero model (Mullahy 1986).
The starting point will be the hurdle model proposed by Wooldridge (2002: 
536-538):
 (1)
	 (2)
Equation (1) gives the probability of the outcome being zero, and equation (2) the 
expected value of the log outcome conditional on x and it being positive. Φ is the 
standard normal cumulative distribution, γ is the vector of parameters of the probit 
model, x is the matrix of regressors, β is the vector of parameters of the oLS (ordinary 
Least Squares) regression, and σ2 is the variance of the distribution of the logarithm of 
y conditional on x and y > 0.
The log-likelihood function becomes (3):
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With D
i 
=	0 when y = 0 and D
i 
= 1 when y > 0. Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates 
can be obtained in the traditional way. Since the log-likelihood function is separable 
with respect to the parameter vectors β and γ, the log-likelihood can always be written 
as the sum of the log-likelihoods from two separate models: a binomial probability and 
a truncated-at-zero model. Hence, the function can always be maximised, without loss 
of information, by maximising the two components separately. Therefore,  are the ML 
parameters for the probit model. In a similar fashion,  are the oLS parameters from the 
regression of log(y) on x using the observations for which the outcome is greater than 
zero. Finally, can be consistently estimated by the standard error of the oLS regression 
(Wooldridge 2002: 537). 
Since hurdle models are not developed in textbooks, the marginal effects of the 
regressors will now be spelled-out. When x
j
 is linear in both tiers, its marginal effect is:
 
(4)
and when x
j
 is quadratic in both tiers its marginal effect becomes:
  
(5)
This covers the cases of most of the variables included in the regressions. When a 
variable is not included in one tier, the marginal effect corresponding to that tier is zero 
(because its coefficient is equal to zero). 
Finally, it can be shown that the elasticity of the outcome with respect to x
j
 is given 
by (6):
The first term of the RHS is the elasticity of the probability of obtaining a positive 
outcome with respect to x
j
, and the second term is the elasticity of the expected value of 
the outcome, given that it is positive, with respect to x
j
. Elasticities and marginal effects 
depend on the values of all the parameters. The convention is to evaluate them at the 
mean values of the regressors. 
An important advantage of the separability property is that other methods can be 
used in the second tier. For instance, Aslam and Kingdon (2005) use a Heckit model 
in the second tier to address selectivity bias. Exploiting this property, three alternative 
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models were used to estimate income in the second stage. The three approaches will be 
discussed below.
6.2. Econometric endogeneity
Mincerian equations are a natural starting point for estimating income equations. It is 
well-known that they show problems arising from the correlation between education 
and unobserved factors, innate ability being the typical example. This has been labelled 
econometric endogeneity, under which oLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. Since 
education is likely to be positively correlated with innate ability, oLS estimates should 
be upward biased. Therefore, typical Mincerian equations can be expected to give an 
upper limit to the returns to education.8
This problem can be solved via IV (Instrumental Variables) or 2SLS (H2SLS, 
Heteroscedastic Two-Stage Least Squares), if informative and valid instruments were 
available. An instrument is informative if it is correlated with the variable that is going 
to be instrumented (education), and is valid if it is not correlated with the unobservable 
characteristics (e.g. ability). Several variables have been proposed as instruments for 
education: number of children, distance to school, and mother’s education, but they are 
not available in the survey.
A dummy variable for public schooling is used as an instrument. Children attending 
a public school reflect lower income of their parents. Children from low-income 
households receive less education, irrespective of their ability. So, attending a public 
school is correlated with receiving less years of formal education and not with the 
individual’s ability. It might be argued that «public» might be correlated with parent’s 
ability, based on that higher ability leads to higher parent’s income, allowing the child 
to attend a private school. However, in Peru, where exclusion plays a central role, path 
dependence seems to be more important than ability in the determination of education 
and incomes. Poor people tend to remain poor and rich people tend to become richer. 
So «public» is not likely to be correlated with ability, only with parents education (which 
in turn is correlated with the individuals education). Another argument against «public» 
is that, being a dummy, it is not a good predictor of the number of years of education. 
Hence, other instruments must be included, therefore estimating a 2SLS. In the 2SLS 
approximation, one variable must be trusted to be exogenous, and the validity of the 
other instruments can be tested based on this variable. «Public» will be the variable with 
which the exogeneity of the rest will be tested. Age and weekly hours worked were also 
used as instruments.
An interesting instrument, and not used in the IV literature, might be sector of 
employment. It may be argued that, controlling by labour category, sector of employment 
8 However, some literature finds even higher returns to education after controlling for endogeneity.
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should be correlated with education, but not with ability. For instance, people who work 
in agriculture need less years of formal education and people who work in manufactures 
tend to have longer years of education. However, the direction of causality is not clear: it 
might be that, given that the individual acquires certain number of years of schooling, he 
decides to work in a specific sector (instead of deciding the years of education according 
to the sector where she wants to work). Therefore this variable will not be used as an 
instrument.
A second way of dealing with endogeneity, although less elegant, is to include proxies 
for ability (HProxies). In the case of the regression with proxies, the assumption is that 
given the same years of education and the same sector of the economy, the individual’s 
ability will determine her labour category, whether she works in the capital or in the 
interior, and the size of the firm where she works at. It must be noticed that labour 
category is not even an ordinal scale: despite a clear ordering may arise between 
employer, white collar, blue collar and self-employed rural; the ordering with respect to 
self-employed urban is not clear, because this category includes street vendors, lawyers 
with private offices and independent consultants. The same problem arises with the size 
of the firm: bigger firms tend to pay higher incomes, except private buffets, independent 
consultants, etc. However, very small fractions of the population fall in these categories, 
so serious problems are not expected.
All proxies for ability are also correlated with education. For instance, having more 
years of education increases the probability of being a white collar. So «white collar» will 
partially capture the individual’s ability, but also the effect of education on income via 
the increase in the probability of being a white collar. Thus, the returns to education 
obtained by this method will tend to be biased downwards.
other factors also influence in the quality of education, as the size of the school, peer 
effects, amongst others. There is a vast literature on education production functions (see 
Glewwe 2002 for a survey, or the work by Hanushek and Luque 2003, Krueger 1999, 
Todd and Wolpin 2003, Case and Deaton 1999) but the necessary information is not 
included in the survey.
A third way to deal with the econometric endogeneity of education is by 
household fixed effects (HFE). The key assumption is that unobserved ability is 
similar for household members. This might not be true. HFE estimation subtracts 
household means from the observed values, and by doing so it eliminates unobserved 
characteristics that are constant across household members. It is important to note 
that by this procedure, households with one income earner must be discarded from 
the sample. In practice this might bias the results, but there is no strong prior as to 
how much or in which direction. Despite the assumption of similar ability may be 
easily acceptable between parents and children, or between brothers, it is not the case 
between spouses. Therefore, the HFE estimation seems to be the weakest methodology 
of the three proposed here.
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Table	5	
Returns	to	education	on	annualised	income	[1]
Econometric	Specification Non-Indigenous Indigenous
Mincerian equation 12.8 12.0
Tobit, Mincerian Specification 15.5 12.6
Hurdle with 2SLS 18.1 13.8
Hurdle with proxies for ability 8.8 5.5
Hurdle with FE 11.3 11.1
Source: Table 6 (for the hurdle models). 
Elaboration: owner. 
[1] All the models are evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables. 
7. RESULTS
7.1. Returns to education
Table 5 shows the returns to education of all the specifications tested, and Table 6 
presents the most important results for the hurdle models.9 The Mincerian equation 
gives returns to education of 12.8% and 12.0% for non-indigenous and indigenous, 
respectively. When the mass of zero incomes is assessed via Tobit regressions, the returns 
to both groups increase to 15.5% and 12.6%, and the difference is statistically significant 
at the 95%. The two-tiered models, which relax some of the restrictions of the Tobit, 
give contrasting results: when 2SLS is used to instrument for education, 18% and 14%; 
when proxies for ability are included, the resulting returns to education are 9% for the 
non-indigenous and 6% for the indigenous. The difference in this case is significant at 
the 95% of confidence. HFE results in 11.3% and 11.1%, though the difference is not 
statistically significant.
7.2. Marginal effects of education
In this section the marginal effects of the non-linear models will be assessed. Since the 
hurdle models with correction for endogeneity are argued to be the best specification 
only these will be analysed in detail.
9 To comply with space limits, it was not possible to include and analyse adequately the results for all the 
regressions. The results are available on request.
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Table	6	
Probability	of	being	paid,	expected	income	for	paid	workers,	and	marginal	effects	of	
education	for	the	hurdle	models	[1],	[2]
Indigenous
Mean probability of being paid 0.791
Mean X Gamma X 2SLS Proxies HFE
Schooling [3] 7.9 0.086 *** 0.144 *** 0.060 *** 0.114 ***
Public [4] 0.9 -0.031 -0.068 *** 0.094 ***
Age 38.6 0.077 *** 0.059 *** 0.070 *** 0.055 ***
Age^2 1489.6 -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
Hours [5] 38.9 0.001 0.034 *** 0.029 *** 0.053 ***
Hours^2 [6] 1511.0 0.016 *** -0.018 *** -0.016 *** -0.037 ***
Size [7] 58.3 0.000 ***
Lima [8] 0.1 0.196 ***
observations 25,149 19,900 19,728 13,019
(Pseudo) R2 0.13 0.22 0.33 0.25
σ [9] 1.36625 1.26760 1.32588
βj [10] 0.144 0.060 0.114
βx/σ [11] 2.569 2.266 2.802
γ [12] 0.999 0.999 0.999
Marginal Effect of Education, Hurdle Models [13] 0.138 0.055 0.111
Non-Indigenous
Mean probability of being paid 0.895
Mean X Gamma X 2SLS Proxies HFE
Schooling [3] 11.1 0.055 *** 0.190 *** 0.093 *** 0.119 ***
Public [4] 0.8 -0.106 -0.157 *** 0.113
Age 35.5 0.083 *** 0.025 ** 0.049 *** 0.054 ***
Age^2 1263.6 -0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 *** -0.001 ***
Hours [5] 42.7 0.017 *** 0.042 *** 0.032 *** 0.044 ***
Hours^2 [6] 1827.4 -0.004 -0.028 *** -0.020 *** -0.032 ***
Size [7] 106.0 0.000 ***
Lima [8] 0.3 0.214 ***
observations 8,261 7,394 7,249 4,323
(Pseudo) R2 0.12 0.28 0.41 0.26
σ [9] 1.07874 0.98689 1.02085
βj [10] 0.190 0.093 0.119
βx/σ [11] 8.217 8.888 8.635
γ [12] 0.952 0.952 0.952
Marginal Effect of Education, Hurdle Models [13] 0.181 0.088 0.113
Source: Enaho 2003. 
Elaboration: owner.
[1] At mean values, for workers aged 14 and over. [2] Included, but not reported: month, sector of the 
economy and constant. [3] Years of formal schooling. [4] Dummy taking the value of one if the individual 
attended a public school. [5] Hours worked per week. [6] Hours worked per week squared divided by 
100 (the coefficient has been normalized to avoid scale problems). [7] Size of the firm. [8] Dummy 
taking the value of one if the individual lives in Metropolitan Lima. [9] Standard Error of the residual. 
[10] Coefficient of education. [11] Linear prediction divided by [9]. [12] Cumulative standard normal 
density function of being paid. [13] Computed according to equation (4), evaluated at mean values. 
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Figure 3A. Returns to Education, H2SLS
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Figure 3B. Returns to Education, HProxies
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Figure 3C. Returns to Education, HFE
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Source: Enaho 2003. 
Elaboration: owner.
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Since hurdle models are non-linear, the information provided by Table 6 is not enough 
to draw strong conclusions. To get a better picture, the marginal effects of education at 
each year of schooling were obtained (holding the other variables at their mean values). 
The results are shown in Figure 3A to 3C. one must have in mind that the results will 
change for every change in the explanatory variables. Any other the calculations can be 
made with the coefficients in Table 6 and equations 4 and 5.
H2SLS and HProxies show a slightly narrowing gap in the returns to education by 
ethnic groups, whereas HFE shows a gap that shrinks significantly with an increase in 
education. According to HFE, education is equalising especially after high school.
As expected, in every case non-indigenous show higher returns to education than 
indigenous. However, the differences are particularly low for the basic Mincerian 
specification as well as for the HFE.10 Which are the «true» returns to education? The 
last three models are likely to be closest because they assess non-normality of the residual 
and endogeneity bias. However, the way endogeneity bias is assessed seems to play a 
central role in the determination of returns to education.
According to previous arguments, HFE seems to be the weakest methodology in 
this sense. Ability may vary widely between spouses; the children’s ability is likely to 
be a function of their parents, but not the same, thus HFE seems to be the weakest 
methodology. As discussed before, HProxies will tend to underestimate the effects of 
education but there is no strong prior that the biases will differ between groups. Since 
«public» seems to be a valid and informative instrument, H2SLS will be treated as the 
best model. It is worth noticing that HProxies and H2SLS predict similar differences in 
the returns to education between ethnic groups, of 3.3% and 4.3%, respectively.
8. SIMULATIoN: EFFECTS oF EXCLUSIoN AND DISCRIMINATIoN oN 
INEQUALITY
In this section exclusion and discrimination will be eliminated by performing simulations 
with the coefficients from the hurdle models, and inequality will be estimated in 
each case. This can be understood only as an initial approach to compare the effects 
of exclusion and discrimination. In a first simulation, income will be estimated for 
indigenous, with the estimated returns of the non-indigenous. This will give an idea of 
what would inequality look like if both groups had the same returns to each variable.
The second simulation tries to answer what would inequality look like if there was 
no exclusion. This exercise might be more difficult to understand, and has not been 
assessed previously. Without exclusion, indigenous people would tend to have the 
10 The lower gap in the Mincerian specification is reasonable, because it drops the null incomes (that 
represent a higher percentage of the indigenous labour force than of the non-indigenous labour force), thus 
leading to the underestimation of the income gaps.
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same values in the determinants of income as the non-indigenous people, i.e. the same 
distribution of explanatory variables. For instance, since the indigenous are excluded 
from the education process, they don’t have access to education to the same degree as the 
non-indigenous. If both groups had the same degree of access to education as the non-
indigenous, they would tend to have the same distribution of years education. The same 
applies to the other determinants of income. Hence, without exclusion, indigenous and 
non-indigenous people would tend to have similar values of the explanatory variables. 
Following this line of argument, an «exclusion-free» income distribution was simulated 
using the explanatory variables for the non-indigenous with the returns obtained for the 
indigenous population for each hurdle model. This gives a smaller sample size for the 
indigenous population, because in the EAP the ratio of indigenous to non-indigenous 
is close to 3:1. In order to get a sample size similar to the indigenous population, each 
of these observations was three-folded.11 This new series and the observed income for 
the non-indigenous constitute the «exclusion free» income distribution. The resulting 
inequality is labelled «exclusion-free» inequality. The same exercise was repeated for each 
hurdle model.
To assess the mass of null incomes, individuals with a probability of less than 60% of 
having a positive income are assigned a null income. Using 50% and 70% as thresholds 
leaves the main results unaffected. 
The results are shown in Table 7. The Gini index for the sample is 0.64. If both groups 
had the same returns to the determinants of income, the Gini index would decrease to 
0.51 in average. If, having different returns, both groups had the same distribution of 
variables (i.e., with no exclusion), Gini index would be reduced even more, to 0.46. This 
shows that exclusion seems to play even a bigger role than discrimination in explaining 
inequality than the income gap.
Table	7	
Simulations	of	income	inequality	indices
Inequality	measures Income
H2SLS HProxies HFE
no	disc no	excl no	disc no	excl no	disc no	excl
Relative mean deviation 0.47 0.38 0.31 0.37 0.32 0.35 0.33
Gini coefficient 0.64 0.52 0.44 0.51 0.46 0.50 0.48
Theil entropy measure 0.82 0.53 0.40 0.53 0.41 0.54 0.51
Theil mean log deviation measure 0.43 0.41 0.22 0.38 0.24 0.34 0.24
Source: Enaho 2003. 
Elaboration: owner.
11 This is not completely accurate, because the survey has a complex stratification structure, and weights vary 
along the population, but that is not being assessed. Thus, this must be seen as a rough approximation only.
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Using definitions that are consistent with the ones adopted in this paper and with 
the same dataset, Figueroa (2006) studies the role of ethnicity in the relationship 
between human capital and the labour market. Briefly consider three groups: the 
white elite (group A1), the mixed (groups A2 and A3) and the indigenous (groups 
B, C, D, and E). Figueroa (2006) using data from Cruzado (2006) shows that 
despite the indigenous population appears to be catching up with the white elite 
in years of education, the groups are not converging in incomes. So, apparently 
increases in education will not reduce inter-ethnic inequality. However, no attention 
is paid to the convergence between the indigenous and the mixed population. In 
addition, the small sample size of the white elite does not allow to arrive to solid 
statistical conclusions when this group is split into age-groups.12 Table 8, adapted 
from Figueroa (2006) shows that indigenous people appear to be catching up with 
the mixed in years of education and income. While the indigenous/mixed ratio of 
years of education for the 55-65 cohort is 0.56, the figure for the 25-34 cohort is 
0.92. Similarly, while the ratio of incomes is 0.29 for the 55-65 cohort, the ratio for 
the 25-34 cohort is 0.69. 
Table	8	
Inter-generational	differences	in	years	of	schooling	(mean	years	of	schooling)	and	
income	(mean	soles	per	month)
Cohort
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-65
Income
Indigenous 530 596 623 473
Mixed 771 987 1195 1626
Ratio 0.69 0.60 0.52 0.29
Years	of	schooling
Indigenous 11 8 7 5
Mixed 12 12 11 9
Ratio 0.92 0.67 0.64 0.56
Source: Enaho 2003, adapted from Figueroa (2006: Table 6A and 6B).	
Elaboration: owner.
12 For instance, the 55-65 cohort, used as a baseline, includes only six observations, which is not 
sufficient to arrive to solid statistical conclusions (see Figueroa 2006: 35-36, Table 6A and Table 6B for 
more details).
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Since education seems to play at least a partial role in reducing inequality, some 
policy experiments will be sketched to illustrate the relevance of the results presented in 
section 7. Their effects on inequality are presented in Table 9:13
1. Policy 1: Increase one year of schooling for the indigenous people who didn’t finish 
high school.
2. Policy 2: Increase three years of schooling for the indigenous people who didn’t 
finish high school, or guarantee they finish high school, whatever is lower. 
3. Policy 3: Increase five years of schooling for the indigenous people who didn’t 
finish high school, or guarantee they finish high school, whatever is lower.
4. Policy 4: Guarantee that all indigenous who finish high school also finish technical 
studies (two years after high school).
Table	9	
Policy	simulations,	H2SLS	model
Status	Quo POL1 POL2 POL3 POL4
Relative mean deviation 0.47 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.37
Gini coefficient 0.64 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.51
Theil entropy measure 0.82 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.54
Theil mean log deviation measure 0.43 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.40
Source: Enaho 2003. 
Elaboration: owner.
Policy 1 can be interpreted as a short term policy, Policy 2 as a medium term, and 
Policy 3 as long term. They would benefit around 70% of the indigenous population 
(Table 1). These three policies would have similar effects on income inequality. An 
increase of one year has a similar effect as an increase in three or five years, because 
the ethnic gap is high and roughly constant at the first stages of education (figures 3A 
to 3C). However, this does not imply that education should be increased in one year 
only, for education is a human right, an end in itself. It increases human liberties and 
capabilities (Sen 1999) and fosters political citizenship (Ames 1978). Therefore, the 
evaluation of the returns to education based just on the effect of education on income 
consists in an underestimation of the true effects.
Policy 4 shows that post high school studies have a stronger impact on income 
distribution. Except for Theil’s second measure, Policy 4 implies the highest reduction 
in inequality. Policy 4 basically guarantees technical education to all the indigenous 
high school graduates. Despite this policy would benefit only 30% of the indigenous 
population, its effects on inequality are higher, because the inter-ethnic income gap is 
13 For the sake of space, only the results for the H2SLS model are presented, but the other models are 
consistent.
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lower at the higher levels of education (figures 3A to 3C). In addition, this policy would 
also give incentives to parents to send their children to school, knowing that after that 
the State would guarantee superior studies, and therefore higher incomes.
Targeting issues arise. Positive discrimination can also be dangerous. Being non-
indigenous does not mean being educated or non-poor. Many non-indigenous people 
also need assistance from the State, and they cannot be left aside.
Does the State have incentives to pursue these policies? If the State maximises votes, 
it lacks incentives to expand education. In the short term, it is more politically profitable 
to give «gifts» than «rights» (Figueroa 2003). While the former consist of basic social 
assistance, food, and clothing, the latter include education, healthcare and political 
citizenship.
The success of the policies illustrated here requires not only the supply of education, 
construction of schools, and hiring of more teachers; demand might also require 
incentives: e.g. to offer breakfast at school, free uniforms, books. 
Endless policies can be simulated. For example, these models could be used to 
assess the effects of universalising primary schooling (attributing six years of schooling 
to anyone who has less than that). Policies not necessarily related to education can also 
be assessed, as promoting migration to the capital or giving incentives to employers 
to hire formal employment (which would also lessen the uncertainty effects of being 
self-employed).
9. CoNCLUSIoNS AND PoLICY IMPLICATIoNS
Between-group inequality contributes to almost 10% of overall inequality; and that 
is reflected on important differences in average income between indigenous and non-
indigenous. Mean income for the non-indigenous people is twice than that for the 
indigenous. Moreover, expected lifetime income for an average indigenous worker is just 
44% of the figure for the average non-indigenous worker.
The econometric analysis in section 7.2 has shown that education has positive 
effects on income, with diminishing marginal effects at each year of schooling. Age 
and hours worked also show positive but decreasing marginal returns. The difference 
in the distribution of years of schooling seems to be one of the most important sources 
of inequality, so reducing the gap in years of schooling would reduce inter-ethnic 
inequality in a significant way. Despite public education is regarded as low-quality, 
promoting it would have positive effects on income. This does not mean that quality 
does not matter, but that, being income inequality so severe, any improvement will 
help. However, other policies should be directed to tackle down the problems outlined 
by Figueroa (2006:11-17).
The literature focuses on the differences in the slopes of the regression lines 
(discrimination), but usually neglects the importance of the distribution of the 
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regressors (exclusion). Trivelli (2005) is a notable exception in this respect, but her 
methodology leaves aside the population with null incomes and therefore her results 
are arguably biased. Addressing the problems of econometric endogeneity of education 
and of truncation-at-zero of the income distribution, this paper has shown that 
exclusion explains a larger share of income inequality than discrimination. According 
to the simulations performed in section 8, without discrimination income inequality 
(measured by the Gini index) would be reduced by 20%, and without exclusion, by 
28%. Hence, despite most quantitative research on Peru’s interethnic income gap has 
focused on discrimination, exclusion seems to be a more important source of inequality, 
and therefore more important to tackle down.
Partial reductions of exclusion in the access to education would reduce inequality 
as much as the complete elimination of discrimination. Four policies are proposed as 
illustrations in section 8, and it is found that increases of one or two years of schooling 
can reduce income inequality (as measured by the Gini) by as much as 15% to 20%, 
depending on whether the change is in the lower or the upper tails of the distribution 
of years of education.
Policies directed to tackle down exclusion tend to be expensive, both politically 
and economically. As Figueroa (2003) argues, no agent has the incentives and the 
resources to change the observed outcome. The government lacks incentives to destine 
resources to the inclusion of excluded populations, because giving gifts is politically 
more profitable than granting rights. As Barrón (forthcoming) shows, this does not 
seem to be a problem of economies of scale either. The agent with both incentives 
and power to implement these policies has not been identified in this paper, which 
constitutes a serious caveat.
The changes in inequality presented here should be taken as lower limits to the 
actual changes. Externalities to lower exclusion or discrimination would transform the 
whole economy: with a better educated labour force, investment in industries that 
demand qualified labour would be profitable, and it is well known that these industries 
drive up wages, with further effects on poverty and inequality. In second place, in a 
more stable country, financial markets can be developed more easily, and therefore 
credit and insurance would be expanded. Although the latter would not reach the poor 
directly (especially not the rural poor), they might be reached indirectly, through social 
networks.14 
14 The effects are highly complex. For thorough reviews of these mechanisms, see Dercon (2004) and 
Fafchamps (2003).
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